Knox v. State ex rel. Otter Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 35787 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-23-2009
Knox v. State ex rel. Otter Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 35787
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Knox v. State ex rel. Otter Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35787" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2267.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2267
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
WENDY KNOX and RICHARD DOTSON,) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., C.L. OTTER, 
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of 
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, 
Attorney General, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Docket No. 35787 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
FILED~ COPY j ~23aIS I 
l Suf'18111(1 Court _court of Apperu, _ __ EnteredonATSby: 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge Presiding 
Curt R. Thomsen, Esq. ISB #2072 
T. Jason Wood, Esq., !SB #5016 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Lawrence G. Wasden Esq 
Attorney General 
Steven Olson, Esq. 
Michael S. Gilmore Esq. 
Clay R. Smith Esq. 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
David F. Hensley Esq 
Counsel to the Governor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0034 
Attorneys for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Table of Cases and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
II. THE FACTS ALLEGED ARE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT 
TO DEFEAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
LACK OF STANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A. Redressability Needs NOT Be Proven With Certainty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
B. IGRA Plainly Prohibits The Tribes Video Gaming If 
LC. §§ 67-429B and -429C Are Invalidated as Unconstitutional ............. 5 
C. Standing Should Be Conferred Because The Amended Complaint Presents 
Issues Of Constitutional And Fundamental Public Importance .............. 19 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DISMISSAL BASED ON RULE 19 ............................... 20 
A. 
B. 
c. 
Standard Of Review ............................................... 20 
The District Court Abuse Its Discretion In Finding That The 
Tribes Are Not "Necessary Parties" Within The Meaning Of Rule 19 ........ 21 
The Tribes Are Not Indispensable Under Rule 19 ........................ 26 
1. The Tribes' voluntary absence does not render them 
indispensable under Rule 19 nor does it relieve the 
Court o[its duty to interpret the Constitution ..................... 26 
2. The Tribes are not "indispensable" under Rule 19 
by arwlication of the "public rights" doctrine .................... 33 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 36 
I 
Signature page ............................................................... 36 
Certificate of service .......................................................... 3 7 
ii 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
15 u.s.c. § 1171 .............................................................. 5 
18 u.s.c. § 1166 ....................................................... 11, 13, 16 
25 u.s.c. § 2710(d)(l) ..................................................... 6, 7, 8 
Article III,§ 20, Idaho Const .......................................... 6, 7, 10, 19, 25 
Idaho Code§ 67-429B ........................................ 1, 2, 5, 7, 17, 22, 25, 35 
Idaho Code§ 67-429C ............................................. 2, 5, 7, 22, 25, 35 
3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac iJ 1001.10 ................................... 28 
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§§ 1607-08 (1972) .................. 20 
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
469 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ..................................... 13, 14 
American Greyhound Racing, Inc., v. Hull, 
146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1067-68 (D. Ariz. 2001) .................... 9, 15, 18, 30, 34 
Andree v. Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1987) ......................... 25 
Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 
353 F.3d 731,720 n.11 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................... 6, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18 
Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 845 (9th Cir. 1997) ..................................... 23 
Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1999) ........... 23 
Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) .................. 3, 4 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 
995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993) ...................................... 15, 18 
Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 120 N.M. 562 (1995) ........................... 19, 22, 24 
Clifton v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 997 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1993) ..................... 23 
1ll 
Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
489 U.S. 1012, 109 S. Ct. 1121, 103 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1989) .................... 33, 34 
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 2003) ........... 27, 29 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 2006) ................. 29 
Daily/and Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474 .................. 30, 31, 32 
Dep't ofTransp. v. Gibbar, 143 Idaho 
937,948, 155 P.3d 1176, 1187 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................... 20 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Stdy Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978) ................... 11 
Family & Children's Center, Inc. v. School City, 
13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. I 994) ........................................... 3 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992) .................. 9, 11, 12 
Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................. 3 
Graves v. Norton, 249 F.3d 1213, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) ............................... 21 
Highsmith v. Chrystler v. Credit C01p., 
18 F.3d 434,439 (7th Cir. 1994) ............................................. 3 
Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1098 .................................. 8 
Keene v Chambers, 271 N.Y. 326,330, 3 N.E.2d 443 (1936) ........................... 28 
Lac Du Flambeau v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490,496 (4th Cir. 2005) ........................ 3, 4 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) ............................. 3, 10, 11 
Lungren v. Community Redev. Agency, 
56 Cal.App.4th 868, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 786 (Cal. App. 1997) .................... 31, 32 
Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho 802,806, 10 P.3d 751,755 (Ct. App. 2000) ................... 16 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, (1803) ........................ 29 
Nat'/ Licorice v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940) ................................ , ...... 35 
IV 
National Wrestling Coaches Ass 'n v. Dept. of Educ., 
366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ...................................... 10, 13, 14 
Parsons v. Del Norte County, 728 F.2d 1234, 1240 (9lh Cir. 1984) ....................... 4 
Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004) ................................ 29, 31, 32 
Plaut v HGH Partnership, 59 A.D.2d 686, 398 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dept 1977) ............. 28 
Renal Physicians Ass 'n v. USDHHS, 489 F.3d 1267 (D.C.Cir. 2007) 
Richard B. Smith Real Estate v. Knudson, 
107 Idaho 597,599,691 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1984) ... : .......................... 20 
Sac and Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001) .......................... 21 
Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 86 N.M. 359 (1974) ............................... 19 
Shermoen v. UnitedStates, 982 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................... 24, 25 
Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205,209,290 P.2d 742, 744 (1955) ......................... 7 
State v. Garden City, 74 Idaho 513,524,265 P.2d 328,333 (1953) ...................... . 
State Farm v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162, 65 S. Ct. 573, 89 L. Ed. 812 (1945) ............... 23 
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 
119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) ................................. 21 
Total Medical Mgmt. v. United States, 
104 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ........................................ 8 
Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass'n v. Aune, 
124 Idaho 132,137,857 P.2d 611,616 (1993) ................................ 16 
United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 
135 F.3d 558,564 (8th Cir. 1998) .......................................... 18 
United States v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians 
of the Santa Ynez Reservation, 33 F. Supp. 2d 862 (C.D.Cal. 1998) ............. 15, 18 
V 
United States ex rel. Steele v Turn Key Gaming, Inc., 
135 F.3d 1249, 1252 [8th Cir 1998] ........................................ 29 
US Ecology, Inc. v. USDOI,231 F.3d20(D.C.Cir. 2000) .......................... 10, 12 
Utter v. Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361,366, 48 P.3d 1250, 255 (2002) ........................ 20 
Valente v. Mills, 93 Idaho 212,215,458 P.2d 84, 87 (1969) ............................ 7 
Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) .............................. 33, 35 
vi 
Appellants Knox and Dotson submit the following points and authorities in reply to the Brief 
for Respondents. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal presents a single, straightforward issue: Can the State defendants (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "the Governor") be allowed to forever insulate from judicial review its 
violation of the Idaho Constitution by agreeing to do so with the Tribes under the guise ofIGRA? 
Despite all the obfuscation from the State, this is the fundamental issue in this case. 
II. 
THE FACTS AS ALLEGED ARE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF STANDING. 
The Governor's central position on the issues of standing and redressability is summarized 
in the following statement from his brief: 
A determination that the gambling activity permitted under §§67-429B and 
-429C falls outside the scope of from the constitutional prohibited in Article 
III, Section 20, does not mean, contrary to Knox's assertions, that tribal video 
game machines are unlawful under IGRA. The Secretary has specifically 
approved inclusion of that gaming in the three northern Idaho tribes' 
compacts. Even were the requested declaratory relief to issue, those 
compacts would remain valid-as would the SBT' s right to offer the purported 
"slot machine" gaming at the Casino through the most-favored-nation 
provision of its compact. . . . The Secretarily-approved compacts, not Idaho 
law, "authorizes" the gaming, and nothing in the declaratory judgment sought 
by Knox would undo that authorization and the attendant legality of the 
machine gaming activity insofar as it comports with§ 67-429B. 
(Respondent's Br£ at 23-24). 
In other words, the Governor believes he can essentially "launder" plainly and admittedly 
unconstitutional gambling by running it through a tribal-state compact and obtaining the knowing 
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or unknowing approval of the Secretary of the Interior. This astonishing argument is similar to, 
though much more audacious than, the district court's reasoning, i.e., that it is speculation to opine 
on the effect of the unconstitutionality of Idaho's Indian Gaming statutes on the tribes' right to 
continue offering slot machines. (R., p. 20 !). Both arguments are based upon fundamental and fatal 
misunderstandings of both the doctrine of standing and the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA). 
A. "Redressability" Need NOT Be Proven With Certainty. 
First, the Governor's convoluted ruminations on the intricacies ofIGRA must be put in the 
proper context. This matter is before the Court on appeal from an order granting a Rule 12 motion 
to dismiss not an action brought under IGRA, but an action brought solely under Idaho law seeking 
a declaratory judgment that LC. §§67-429B and -429C are in direct contravention of the Idaho 
constitution. IGRA is relevant only to the extent it bears on the standing question of"redressability," 
i.e., whether the requested declaratory judgment is likely to redress Knox and Dotxon's injuries. 
On this point it is clear from the Governor's brief that he would impose on Knox and Dotson 
the burden of proving with almost absolute certainty that IGRA would compel the Shoshone-
Barmock Tribe to remove its slot machines, and that this must be established by specific allegations 
of the amended complaint. (See Respondent's brf., pp. 23). Indeed, the Governor maintains that 
redressability requires that "the requested judgment or the broader legal landscape [must) compel[] 
the State Officials or the federal government to take any action in pursuit of objectives that would 
redress Knox's purported injury,"(id. at 19, emphasis added), as if the burden of proof for standing 
were the same as the burden required for mandamus relief. Imposition of such a heavy burden is 
contrary to established law. 
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"As this court has noted, the Article III standing requirements are rather 'undemanding."' 
Family & Children's Center, Inc. v. School City, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation 
omitted). Id. "In addition, the plaintiff need not show absolutely that a favorable judgment would 
redress his injury; a 'probabilistic benefit from winning a suit' is adequate." Id. (citation omitted). 
"Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that there is a 'guarantee' that their injuries will be redressed by a 
favorable decision .... Plaintiffs 'must show only that a favorable decision is likely to redress [ their 
injuries), not that a favorable decision will inevitably redress [their injuries].'" Wilbur at 1108-09 
(quoting Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
In applying this "undemanding" standard, the Court's review is not limited to the four comers 
of the complaint. "A motion to dismiss for lack of standing should not be granted unless there are 
no set of facts consistent with the complainant's allegations that could establish standing." Lac Du 
Flambeau v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490,496 (4'h Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing Hishon, 467 U.S. 
at 73). "A plaintiff needs only to plead general allegations of injury in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, for 'we presume that general allegations embrace those specific fact necessary to support 
the claim." Bernhardt v. County o/Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 866 (9'h Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); 
See also Lac Du Flambeau, 422 F.3d at 496 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 497 U.S. 871 
(1990) ). Even where the complaint is silent on facts necessary to establish standing, the courts will 
consider new facts raised for the first time on appeal, so long they are consistent with the complaint. 
Id. (citing Highsmith v. Chryst/er v. Credit Corp., 18 F.3d 434,439 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
Consequently, to establish redressability it is unnecessary to make specific allegations in the 
complaint delineating how or why the requested relief will redress the plaintiffs injuries. Instead, 
to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing based on redressability, "a plaintiff need only 
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plead 'tltat tltere is a substantial likeliltood tltat tlte relief requested will redress the injury 
claimed."' Lac Du Flambeau, 422 F.3d at 501. Plaintiff's Amended complaint makes precisely this 
allegation. 1 "At this stage of the proceedings, we do not speculate as to the plausibility of this 
allegation, [citation omitted], or as to its sufficiency to establish liability." Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 
869 (citing Parsons v. Del Norte County, 728 F.2d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984) (Poole J., concurring) 
("The point is not whether these arguments will prevail but whether they have enough substance to 
require addressing.")). The district court's order and judgment of dismissal must therefore be 
reversed for this reason alone. 
Based on the foregoing standards, the Ninth Circuit in Bernhardt reversed the district court's 
dismissal for lack of standing, including redressability, under far more tenuous and speculative 
circumstances than those presented here. In that case plaintiff Bernhardt filed a Section 1983 action 
alleging Los Angeles County settles civil rights actions only on a lump sum basis that includes all 
attorney fees to which the prevailing plaintiff is entitled under Section 1988, and that this policy 
interfered with her implicit right under Section 1988 to obtain an attorney. After concluding that the 
concrete injury and causation elements of standing were satisfied, the Ninth Circuit turned to the 
redressability requirement: 
In Lujan, for example ... [b Jecause other federal agencies were not bound by 
the Secretary's regulation, the relief sought would not have remedied the 
plaintiffs' injury and, therefore, the plaintiff lacked standing. 504 U.S. at 
571. [other citations omitted]. 
Here, too, prospective relief against the County would not necessarily 
remedy Bernhardt's alleged injury because third parties are involved. A 
'See R., p. 14218: "Plaintifrs have standing to bring this motion because they each have suffered injuries 
in fact, because there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress their 
injuries, and because their injuries are different from those suffered by the general public .... " (Emphasis 
added). 
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change in the County's alleged policy would not require a change in behavior 
of the private attorneys who declined to represent her. Bernhardt did not 
alleged that the attorney who expressly told her that he turned her down 
solely because of the County's policy would represent her in her underlying 
appeal if the policy was enjoined or declared invalid. Despite the 
speculative nature of her claim ofredressability, however, Bernhardt is 
entitled at this stage of the litigation to have her allegations accepted as 
true and therefore we conclude that her complaint satisfied the 
redressability requirement. 
279 F.3d at 869-70 (emphasis added). 
Here, there is no speculation or doubt whether a judgment favorable to Knox and Dotson will 
cause some third party to make unfettered choices which will redress Knox and Dotson's injuries. 
As explained below, state and federal officials are not only substantially likely to act in such a way, 
it is presumed they will do so. Infra at 9, 11-14. But in either case, at this stage in the proceedings 
the allegations in the complaint are plainly sufficient to satisfy the redressability requirement. 
B. IGRA Plainly Prohibits The Tribes' Video Gaming If I.C. §§67-429B and -429C Are 
Invalidated As Unconstitutional. 
The Governor contends that neither he, the Tribes, nor any federal official, would be required 
to take any action to remove the slot machines at the SBT casino in the event of a declaratory 
judgment in Knox and Dotson's favor, and therefore such a judgment would not redress Knox and 
Dotson's injuries. In making this argument, the Governor wildly misinterprets IGRA and welJ-
settled federal case law. 
Under any reasonable interpretation of IGRA and the Johnson Act, the tribes' gaming 
machines, which constitute Class III gaming under IGRA, are prohibited unless the laws of the State 
ofidaho permit such gaming. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, "The Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1171-1178, prohibits the possession or use of' gambling devices,' including slot machines, within 
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Indian country. Id. § ll 7l(a). IGRA waives application of the Johnson Act if the slot-machine 
gaming is conducted under an effective Tribal-State compact that 'is entered into ... by a State in 
which gambling devices are legal."' Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 73 !, 
720 n.11 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(6)). 
This analysis is the same as, and is subsumed under, the analysis under IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 
2710( d)(l) which similarly prohibits Class III gaming on Indian lands unless each of three conditions 
are met: (1) such gaming is approved by the governing body of the Tribe and the Chairman of the 
National Indian Gaming Commission ("NIGC"); (2) such gaming is permitted by the state for any 
purpose by any person, organization or entity; and (3) the tribe and state enter into a compact that 
is approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 716, 720 & n.11 (citing 25 
u.s.c. § 2710( d)(l )). 
In his brief the Governor does not dispute, and in fact has admitted, that the "tribal video 
gaming machines" at issue constitute "casino gambling" or "slot machines" prohibited by Article 
III, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution. (Appendix to Appellants' opening Brief, p. 5). Indeed the 
Governor does not appear to dispute that a judgment declaring the tribal gaming statutes 
unconstitutional would void all provisions in the Idaho tribal-state compacts purporting to authorize 
such gaming. Instead, their position is that it is "immaterial" whether the statutes are judicially 
declared unconstitutional and that tribal slot machines are not permitted by Idaho law. All that 
matters according to the Governor is that a tribal-state compact originally purported to authorize 
such gaming and that the compact was originally approved by the Secretary. 
In order to maintain this position, the Governor completely ignores the second IGRA 
requirement for legalized gambling on Indian lands in Idaho and focuses entirely on the third 
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requirement. Yet the Governor has failed to identify a single legal authority abrogating the second 
requirement, i.e., such gaming must be permitted by Idaho law. There is no such authority. Plainly, 
permission by state law is an absolute requirement for the continuing validity of the compact and of 
the legality of the tribes' ongoing class III gaming. 
The only Idaho law identified by the State purporting to "permit" the tribal slot machines are 
Idaho Code §§67-429B and -429C. If judgment were entered declaring these statutes in violation 
of Article III, § 20 of the Idaho Constitution, the statutes would be rendered void, conferring no 
rights and affording no protection, leaving only the unambiguous prohibition of all slot machines set 
forth in Article III,§ 20, Idaho Const. See Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205,209, 290 P.2d 742, 744 
(1955); State v. Garden City, 74 Idaho 513,524,265 P.2d 328, 333 (1953); Valente v. Mills, 93 
Idaho 212,215,458 P.2d 84, 87 (I 969). In that event, the tribes' slot machines clearly would NOT 
be "permitted" by Idaho within the meaning ofIGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710( d)(I ), but would instead be 
prohibited under IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l), and the Johnson Act. 
Contrary to the Governor's assertions, an existing secretary-approved compact purporting 
to authorize gaming prohibited by IGRA is simply invalid, since that satisfies only one of three 
preconditions necessary for legal gaming on Indian lands. No action by the Governor, nor any 
"consent" of the tribes, is necessary to reach this conclusion. It is demanded by simple logical 
syllogism: 
1. If slot machines are not permitted by Idaho law, then IGRA and the Johnson 
Act prohibit the tribes from conducting slot machine gaming on Indian lands 
in Idaho. 
2. A declaratory judgment that the Idaho tribal gaming statutes are in violation 
of the Idaho Constitution's unambiguous prohibition of slot machines, would 
mean that slot machines are not permitted by Idaho law. 
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3. Therefore, if such a declaratory judgment were entered, IGRA and the 
Johnson Act would prohibit the tribes from conducting slot machine gaming 
on Indian lands in Idaho. 
The result is the same even if, as the Governor maintains, the SBT compact were required 
by some strange interpretation ofIGRA to be modified to remove authorization of gaming judicially 
declared to be prohibited by Idaho law. There are three alternative reasons for this. First, the SBT 
compact does not specify any particular type of gaming authorized by the compact. Rather, it simply 
authorizes '"any gaming activity that the State of Idaho permits for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity,' as the phrase is interpreted in the context of the [IGRA)."2 (R., p. 80 i)4.a.). 
The compact prohibits all other forms of Class III gaming. Id. Because the requested declaratory 
judgment obviously would mean that Idaho does not permit slot machines within the meaning of 
IGRA, then it automatically follows that neither are such slot machines authorized by the compact. 
Second, even if the compact or some undisclosed amendment thereof could somehow be 
construed as authorizing slot machines statutes judicially declared unconstitutional, the same would 
be void ab initio as against public policy. See Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F .3d at 1098 
(Federal courts apply general principles of contract law in construing IGRA compacts); Total 
Medical Mgmt. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("A contract which is plainly 
illegal is a nullity and void ab initio. ") (internal quotations omitted). Such a provision in the 
2 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that the SBT compact must be amended in order for 
the tribes to be permitted to conduct tribal slot machine gaming, Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 
1095 (9"' Cir. 2006), the Governor has neither included any such amendment in the record below or in the 
appendix to its brief on appeal nor has he asserted that a written amendment to the compact even exists. 
Appellant's efforts to locating such amendment from the State of Idaho have been unsuccessful. In the 
absence of a writing evidencing the amendment, it would appear that the state and the tribes have not 
"enter[ ed] into a compact" authorizing such gaming within the meaning ofIGRA, 25 U .S.C. § 2710( d)( l ), 
and in that event such gaming would be prohibited by IGRA and the Johnson Act. 
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compact would also be void because the Governor did not have authority in the first instance to enter 
into an IGRA compact with the tribes authorizing gaming not permitted by Idaho law. See American 
Greyhound, 146 F.Supp.2d at 1030 ("Since A.R.S. § 5-601 [purporting to authorize the Governor 
to negotiate tribal-state compacts for class II gaming] violates article III of the Arizona Constitution 
and is void, the Governor is not enabled to enter compacts."); Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 717 
( stating that once the California Supreme Court issued its ruling declaring as unconstitutional the 
ballot proposition purporting to legalize otherwise illegal class III Indian gaming, "the State no 
longer had authority to execute the compacts" which purported to authorized such gaming). 
Thus, upon entry of the declaratory judgment, the SBT compact would either automatically 
prohibit the tribes' slot machines, by operation of section 4.a. of the compact, which mirrors the 
IGRArequirement of state permission, or if the compact can nevertheless be construed as purporting 
to authorize the tribes' slot machines, it would be void ab initio to that extent. In either case, 
contrary to the Governor's assertions, no "unfettered discretion" at all would have to exercised by 
either the Governor or the Secretary in order prohibit the SBT slot machines. The slot machines 
would be automatically prohibited by IGRA and the Johnson Act upon entry of the requested 
declaratory judgment. Under such circumstances the Court must presume the government officials 
will NOT shirk their responsibility to enforce the law. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 
120 L. Ed. 2d 636, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992), Artichoke Joe's, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08 (and 
numerous cases cited therein). 
Finally, even if, despite the foregoing, some action were deemed necessary to invalidate an 
otherwise void SBT compact provision purporting to authorize gaming judicially declared 
unconstitutional, the Governor would be required by Section 18 of the compact to file suit in federal 
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district court for judicial resolution of the issue if informal dispute resolution were unsuccessful.3 
It is highly likely, if not inevitable, that in the event Knox and Dotson obtain their declaratory 
judgment, the dispute resolution under the compact would ultimately result in a determination that 
Idaho law clearly would not "permit" the tribal slot machines within the meaning ofIGRA, which 
would thereby prohibit such machines and require their removal. Again, the Governor has not 
disputed, and in fact has conceded, that the statutes purporting to authorize tribes' "video gaming 
machines" are in violation of Art. III §20 of the Idaho Constitution. (See Appellants' opening Brief, 
pp. 10, 13-14; and p. 5 of the Appendix thereto). 
In its brief the Governor attempts to avoid this result by characterizing the actions of these 
government officials as based solely upon the "unfettered choices" (Resp. Brf. at 18, citing Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 561-62), and "broad and legitimate discretionary decisions" of government officials (id 
at 19, citing US Ecology, Inc. v. USDOI, 231 F.3d 20 (D.C.Cir. 2000)), and upon the mere 
"possibility" that Knox and Dotson will have "better odds" of obtaining redress by the requested 
relief than without it. (Id. at 21, citing National Wrestling Coaches Ass 'n v. Dept. of Educ., 366 F.3d 
930 (D.C. Cir. 2004). He concludes from this that any connection between the requested judgment 
and any actions of state or federal officials that would redress Knox and Dotson's injuries as not only 
speculative but "positively chimerical." (id. at 23). However, it is apparent from the Governor's 
own brief, the aforesaid decisions relied upon for this remarkable proposition are distinguishable 
3Section 18 provides: 
"The following resolution process, including but not limited to the judicial resolution process, shall 
apply exclusively for the resolution of issues arising under the provisions of this Compact. 
a. Compliance. If either party believes the designated representative of the other party 
has failed to comply with any of the provisions of this Compact shall invoke the following procedure [for 
Informal Dispute Resolution and, if that is not successful, Judicial Resolution]. 
(R., pp. 98-101 (emphasis added). 
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on the one issue that matters - whether government officials' actions necessary to redress the 
plaintiffs' injuries are truly unfettered by the Idaho constitution and the Federal statutory scheme that 
would prohibit the very conduct which caused the plaintiffs harm-illegal gambling. 
For example, the plaintiffs in Lujan challenged a regulation of the Secretary of Interior 
requiring federal agencies to consult with him on the effect of their actions on endangered species. 
However, "[b ]ecause other federal agencies were not bound by the Secretary's regulation, the relief 
sought would not have remedied the plaintiffs' injury and, therefore, the plaintiff lacked standing." 
Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 869-70 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571). Unlike Lujan, the federal 
government is bound by IGRA and the Johnson Act, which prohibit slot machines on Indian lands 
in a state that does not permit such gaming. Contrary to the Governor's assertions, it is well-
established that "plaintiffs do not need to prove a negative, "namely that the tribes would not engage 
in illegal gaming in order to demonstrate redressability." Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. 
Norton, 216 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1108-09 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. 
Stdy Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978) and Lujan, supra), affirmed, 353 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2003). It is 
equally well-established that "even if the tribes were inclined to violate IGRA and state penal code 
prohibitions, there is no reason to assume that the federal government would shirk its enforcement 
responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 by countenancing illegal class III gaming by Indian tribes." 
Id. 
The instant case is much more closely analogous to Artichoke Joe's, in which the court 
similarly distinguished Lujan under facts almost identical to those presented here: 
[ A }though redressabi!ity may depend, at least in part, on the actions of third 
parties, this case more closely resembles Franklin [v. Massachussetts, 505 
U.S. 788 (1992)] than it does Lujan. Indeed, unlike in Lu;an where it was 
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unclear whether outside agencies would be bound by the Secretary of the 
Interior's interpretation to require consultation for international projects, a 
ruling that invalidates the compacts and Proposition lA would conclusively 
establish the illegality of any continued class III gaming by Indian tribes. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555. The sole contingency, therefore, would be whether 
the federal authorities responsible for prosecuting illegal gaming would do 
so, and, as in Franklin, Made in the USA, and Eu, the court is entitled to 
expect that they will follow the law. 
Id., 216 F.Supp.2d at 1109. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Artichoke Joe's and "agree[d] 
with the district court's cogent application ofU.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding constitutional 
standing .... " Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 719 n.9. 
The Governor's disagreement with this conclusion is based on the bare assertion that 
"[ something) in the requested judgment or the broader legal landscape [must] compel the State 
Officials or the federal government to take [ ] action in pursuit of objectives that would redress 
Knox's purported injury. "(Resp. Brf. at 19) (emphasis added). The Governor wrongly assumes 
and applies a burden of proof which is not required. Know and dotson need not shoulder the same 
burden as required to establish mandamus relief. The Governor's wrong premise unsupported and 
is directly contradicted by Artichoke Joe's and the Franklin line of cases, which hold that it is 
presumed the government will not refuse shirk its duty to enforce the constitution and laws which 
it swore an oath to uphold. The Governor has failed to cite a single legal authority rejecting, 
questioning, or even distinguishing from the instant case the holding of Artichoke Joe's. It is 
directly on point and should govern here. 
The Governor also misplaces reliance on US Ecology, in which the plaintiff's claim for a 
patent to land owned by the federal government depended entirely on the State of California's 
decision, completely unfettered by any statute or regulation, to pursue acquisition of title to the land 
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site from the federal government. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, California decided to terminate 
its efforts to acquire the land. Id., 231 F.3d at 25. No statute or regulation required California to 
take action resulting in acquisition of the property or prohibited California from taking action that 
would result in the failure to such acquisition. Unlike US Ecology, here the Governor and federal 
government are in fact "fettered,"namelyby IGRA, the Johnson Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 1166, and also 
by the SBT compact which would prohibit the tribes' slot machine gaming upon entry of a 
declaratory judgment voiding Idaho's tribal gaming statutes, as explained above. Pursuant to the 
Franklin/Artichoke Joe's line of cases, it is presumed for purposes of standing that the federal 
authorities will not shirk their enforcement responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § I 166. 
Finally, in National Wrestling Coaches, as the D.C. Circuit explained in a subsequent 
decision distinguishing the case, "wrestling coaches were found to lack standing because, in order 
for their injuries to be redressed, a wrestling program would have to be reinstated, possibly at the 
expense of another men's athletic program, and no school had indicated an inclination to do so." 
Abigail Alliance/or Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (citing National Wrest. Coaches, 366 F.3d at 936-40). In National Wrestling, and Renal 
Physicians Ass 'n v. USDHHS, 489 F.3d 1267 (D.C.Cir. 2007) also cited by the Governor, it was 
private actors, not government officials, whose actions were unregulated by any legal framework but 
still necessary to obtain redress of the plaintiff's injuries. This alone distinguishes Nat'! Wrestling 
from the Franklin/Artichoke Joe's line of cases and from the instant case, where it is presumed that 
third-party government officials will act in accordance with authoritative statements of the law by 
the courts regarding those officials' statutory or regulatory duties. 
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Moreover, the D.C. Circuit itselfhas distinguished National Wrestling where there is reason 
to believe that the requested remedy indeed would influence the actions of an unregulated private 
third party in such a way as to redress the plaintiffs injuries. For example, in Abigail Alliance, the 
plaintiff alliance sued for an order changing FDA regulations which restricted drug companies' sale 
of investigational drugs to the public. The FDA argued that the plaintiff failed to establish 
redressability because "even if its regulations were changed, it is merely speculation that drug 
manufacturers would sell their investigational medications to members of the Alliance." Id., 469 
F.3d at 135. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that unlike National Wrestling, "[h]ere, it 
would be in the drug companies' pecuniary interests to expand access to experimental drugs and 
thereby develop a market, particularly if the FDA allows them to charge market prices. This makes 
the question ofredressability a hardly-speculative exercise in naked capitalism, and our skepticism 
from National Wrestling Coaches Ass'n need not transfer." Id. 
Likewise, National Wrestling is distinguishable for the additional reason that here there are 
very good statutory reasons to believe that upon entry of the requested declaratory judgment, the 
SBT slot machines will likely be removed, for the reasons set forth above. Namely, because it would 
be presumed the federal government will not shirk its duty to enforce the clear federal statutory 
injunctions against slot machines on Indian land, once a declaratory judgment is entered making it 
clear that Idaho does not "permit such gaming" within the meaning ofIGRA and the Johnson Act. 
The government next relies upon the so-called "most favored nations" provision in the SBT 
compact, §24.d.4, arguing that regardless whether Idaho's tribal gaming statutes are judicially 
4
"In the event any other Indian tribe is permitted by compact or final court decision to conduct any Class ill 
games in Idaho in addition to those games permitted by this Compact, this Compact shall be amended to 
permit the Tribes to conduct those same additional games." Idaho-SBT Compact (R., p. 103 §24.d.). 
14 
declared unconstitutional, SBT would still be authorized to engage in slot machine gaming because 
Idabo's compacts with the other Idabo tribes authorize such gaming. A decision in this action will 
effect the law and will apply to every compact, and is not limited to just the SBT. Further, this 
argument is hopelessly circular and merely adds another layer to the same "patent bootstrapping" 
universally rejected by the courts. As established in Appellants' opening brief, gaming otherwise 
prohibited by state law is not "permitted" within the meaning ofIGRA simply because the Governor 
decides to ignore the prohibition and enters into a tribal compact authorizing the illegal gaming. 
Rather, the state must first legalize such gaming before it can be authorized by compact. American 
Greyhound Racing, Inc., v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1067-68 (D. Ariz. 2001) ( citing Citizen Band 
Pota:watomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Santee 
Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558,564 (8th Cir. 1998) (favorably quoted and cited in Artichoke 
Joe's, 353 F.3d at 720-21 & 724), vacated on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
The Governor attempts to distinguish American Greyhound, on the basis that unlike that case 
the SBT compact has no expiration but "remains in effect until renegotiated or replaced," which 
"cannot occur without SB T's consent." However, this is merely a recycled version of the governor's 
central position on appeal, that which has. been refuted above. Supra at 5-14. The fact that a 
compact has already been entered and is not up for renewal is a distinction without a difference. The 
fact that more than 60 tribal-state gaming compacts had already been entered was no impediment 
to redressability in Artichoke Joe's, supra, and neither is it an impediment here. No renewal, 
renegotiation, consent, or any other action is necessary for the requested declaratory judgment to 
render the tribes' slot machine gaming prohibited under IGRA and the Johnson Act, for the reason 
established above. It is a necessary consequence of the entry of such a declaratory judgment, making 
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it highly likely that the federal government would not shirk its enforcement responsibilities under 
18 U.S.C. § 1166, thereby redressing Knox and Dotson's injuries. 
Thus, for the same reasons as set forth above, a judgment declaring unconstitutional the Idaho 
tribal gaming statutes would likewise render void ab initio any portion of the compacts with the 
other Idaho tribes purporting to authorize slot machines. In that event, the other Idaho Indian tribes 
would not be "permitted by compact" to conduct such games within the meaning of the "most 
favored nations" provision in the SBT. 
Furthermore, the Governor misinterprets section 24.d. of the SBT compact. If construed as 
authorizing gaming prohibited by Idaho law and thereby prohibited by IGRA and the Johnson Act, 
as the Governor maintains, a declaratory judgment that the Idaho tribal gaming statutes are 
unconstitutional would render section 24.d void ab initio for the same reasons set forth above, 
leaving only Section 4, which in that case, by its terms, would prohibit the slot machines. Moreover, 
"[a]pparently conflicting provisions must be reconciled so as to give meaning to both, rather than 
nullifying any contractual provision, if reconciliation can be effected by any reasonable interpretation 
of the entire instrument." Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P.3d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(some citations omitted); Accord, Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass'n v. Aune, 124 Idaho 132, 137, 857 
P .2d 611, 616 (1993). The only way to preserve section 24.d., and the only reasonable interpretation 
given the injunctions of section 4 of the SBT compact, is that the compact shall be amended to 
authorize gaming permitted by compact with other Idaho tribes only if such gaming is permitted by 
Idaho law within the meaning of IGRA. 
The Governor next argues that there is a so-called "dispute" among the federal circuits over 
the circumstances in which a state "permits such gaming" under IGRA, and that under the 
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Governor's interpretation a declaratory judgment that LC. §§67-429B and-429C is unconstitutional 
would (somehow) not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such gaming was not "permitted" by 
the State ofidaho. (Respondent's brf. at 25-27). This is argument is a fatuous smokescreen. 
It is true that there is some federal dispute over whether IGRA's "permits such gaming" 
requirement means that a state "permits such gaming" if its laws are silent on the matter, or if state 
law must expressly allow the specific form of gaming at issue. For a thorough discussion of this 
dispute, including the cases cited by the Governor, see Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 720-23. But 
clearly that is not the issue here. Idal10 law is NOT silent on whether slot machines are permitted. 
Article III §20 of the Idaho Constitution unambiguously forbids such gaming. I.C. §§67-429B and 
-429C are in patent violation of this constitutional provision, and a declaratory judgment to that 
effect will leave no doubt that Idaho law does NOT permit such gaming. As the Ninth Circuit 
explained in Artichoke Joe's, that is precisely what distinguishes this case, and the Citizen Band v. 
Green/American Greyhound "bootstrapping" line of cases, from those cases in dispute over the 
meaning of "pennits such gaming": 
Proposition IA distinguishes the present controversy from the 'bootstrapping' 
cases. Proposition IA does more than authorize the Governor to enter into 
Tribal-State compacts. It explicitly states that slot machines, lottery games, 
and banking and percentage card games are hereby permitted to be conducted 
and operated on tribal lands' subject to the regulations embodied in the 
Tribal-State compact. Thus, there is law-separate from the compact 
itself-that 'permits such gaming' in certain circumstances. 
Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 721 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Unlike Artichoke Joe's and the cases cited by the Governor, upon entry of the requested 
declaratory judgment there would be no law in Idaho purporting to permit the tribes' slot machines, 
and the remaining extant law unambiguously prohibits such gaming. There is absolutely no federal 
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dispute that this clearly does not satisfy IGRA's "permits such gaming" requirement. The 
"bootstrapping" cases cited by the Ninth Circuit in Artichoke Joe's, and the additional 
"bootstrapping" cases cited above (supra at 9, 11-12) and in Appellant's principal brief (pp. 22-26), 
all agree that this would not satisfy IGRA's "permits such gaming" requirement.5 Apparently, they 
have never been challenged. The Governor is only attempting to obfuscate the issue without a legal 
basis. 
The need for these tactics is revealed in the Governor's following statement: 
Aside from the absence of any plausible avenue for challenging the 
Secretary's approval and the substantive controversy over the term "such 
gaming" are significant public policy interests that must play an integral role 
in any determination to pursue removal of"slot machines" from the Casino. 
Elimination of tribal video gaming machines . . . will have a profoundly 
disruptive effect on the settled economic expectations o_f, and planning by, 
a substantial group of private and government actors. 
(Resp. Brf. at 27-28) (emphasis added). However, the Governor appears not to understand that 
Idaho public policy is set in the Constitution and laws, and not on economic expectations. This case 
is not about money and economic expectations, it is about the Idaho Constitution. There is no legal 
justification for this argument. Apparently it is based on the hope that this Court will be swayed by 
considerations other than the law. Such rank cynicism requires no further comment. 
5SeeAmerican Greyhound Racing, Inc., v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001) ("holding that 
tribal gaming purportedly authorized by compact was not "permitted" by Arizona within the meaning of 
IGRA because such gaming was plainly prohibited by Arizona statute), vacated on other grounds, 305 
F.3d 1015 (9ili Cir. 2002) (describing the district court's opinion regarding standing as "meticulous and 
exhaustive"); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.Zd 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that Oklahoma does not permit certain gambling devices within the meaning oflGRA because 
Oklahoma statute expressly forbids it); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558, 
564 (8th Cir. 1998) (same with regard to Nebraska law clearly prohibiting the particular gaming at issue); 
US. v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation, 33 F. Supp. 2d 862 
(C.D.Cal. 1998) (describing games expressly illegal under state law as "uncompactable" under IGRA, 
and holding that tribe must cease all such gaming). 
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C. Standing Should Be Conferred Because The Amended Complaint Presents Issues Of 
Constitutional And Fundamental Public Importance. 
If somehow the Court were to find, despite the foregoing, that the traditional rules of standing 
have not been satisfied, standing should still be conferred on the Appellants. In Clark v. Johnson, 
904 P.2d 11, 120 N.M. 562 (1995) the court was faced with issues remarkably similar to the present 
controversy. The plaintiffs's complaint against the New Mexico Governor prayed for, inter alia, 
a declaratory judgment that a tribal-state gaming compact under IGRA was executed by the 
Governor in violation of the New Mexico constitution. The Governor asserted, as does the Idaho 
Governor here, that the petitioners lacked standing to mount such a constitutional challenge. The 
court rejected the argument, as follows: 
In the present proceeding, two of the Petitioners are state legislators, and all 
three are voters and taxpayers. However, as in Sego, we need not consider 
whether those factors independently confer standing to bring this action 
because, as in Sego, the issues presented are of "great public interest and 
importance." Id. Petitioners assert in the present proceeding that the 
Governor has exercised the state legislature's authority. Their assertion 
presents issues of constitutional and fundamental importance; in resolving 
those issues, we will contribute to this State's definition of itself as a 
sovereign. "We simply elect to confer standing on the basis of the 
importance of the public issues involved." 
Id., 904 P.2d at 18 (quoting Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 86 N.M. 359 (1974)). 
Knox and Dotson have standing under this Court's definition· of same. They have suffered 
particularized injury from the actions involved apart from the general public. However, this case is 
not only about them. The Governor entered into a gaming compact with the tribes based upon 
statutes he knew were in patent violation of the Idaho Constitution. The constitutional issues 
implicated by such an action are therefore not limited to Article III § 20. Without the ability to 
question the Governor's actions our system of constitutional democracy is threatened. If Knox and 
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democracy is threatened. If Knox and Dotson cannot question the actions taken given truer statuts 
and injuries, it will set a dangerous precedent wbich potentially could be used to justify other action 
in derogation of the Idabo Constitution. The dubious application of the doctrine of standing, or for 
that matter of Rule 19, as espoused by the Governor cannot be countenanced to shield brazenly 
unconstitutional conduct. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DISMISSAL 
BASED ON RULE 19. 
The Governor argues in the alternative that even if the district court erred in dismissing the 
amended complaint for lack of standing, it did err in not dismissing the amended complaint under 
Rule 19, IRCP, for failure to join a necessary and indispensable party, namely the SBT. 
A. Standard Of Review. 
As the Governor concedes, this Court reviews the district court's decision regarding Rule 19 
for an abuse of discretion. (Resp. Brf. at 33). See also Utter v. Gibbins, 137 Idabo 361,366, 48 P.3d 
1250, 255 (2002); Banko/Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idabo 320,323,647 P.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 1982) 
(citing 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§§ 1607-08 (1972)). An appellate 
court should affirm a lower court's decision on any proper ground, even ifit is different from the one 
applied by that the lower court. Dep't o/Transp. v. Gibbar, 143 Idabo 937, 948, 155 P.3d 1176, 
1187 (Ct. App. 2006); Richard B. Smith Real Estate v. Knudson, 107 Idabo 597, 599, 691 P.2d 1212, 
1214 (1984). Thus, the Governor's speculations about whether the district court's decision would 
have been different had it been thinking something else, is irrelevant. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Finding That The Tribes Are Not 
"Necessary Parties" Within The Meaning Of Rule 19. 
The district court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acts within the boundaries of discretion and consistent with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. 
(R., p. 196) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 
993, 1000 (1991) ). Obviously the district court perceived that the decision on the governor's motion 
under Rule 19 was discretionary. 
Turning to the second element and third elements, a party is "necessary" under Rule l 9(a)(l) 
if"(l) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties; or 
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 
person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk ofincurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the 
claimed interest." There is no legitimate dispute that SBT is NOT necessary within the meaning of 
Rule 19(a)(l)(l)-complete relief clearly can be accorded to the existing parties to this case. The 
Tenth Circuit has held that this Rule 19 requirement was not satisfied under similar circumstances: 
Like its claims in Sac and Fox Nation [v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 
2001)], the State of Kansas' claims focus on the propriety of an agency 
decision that he tract qualifies for Indian gaming under IGRA. Thus, the 
absence of the Miami Tribe does not prevent the State from obtaining its 
requested relief or an adequate judgment. 
Graves v. Norton, 249 F.3d 1213, 1226 (10 th Cir. 2001). 
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Like Graves, Knox and Dotson's claim focus exclusively on the constitutional propriety of 
the Idaho tribal gaming statutes upon which the Governor purportedly based his authority to allow 
slot machines in the SBT compact. Thus the SBT's absence from the instant controversy by no 
means can be said to prevent Knox and Dotson from obtaining a judicial determination of such 
constitutional propriety. Consequently, SBT can be a necessary party only if it claims an interest that 
would be impaired if this matter proceeds in its absence, pursuant to under Rule l 9(a)(l)(2). 
On that point the district court found that the tribes are not "necessary parties" within the rule 
because, inter alia, "[t]he Plaintiffs in this case do not seek to enjoin the Tribe from operating the 
tribal video gaming machines .... They are seeking a declaration that LC. §67-429B and §67-429C 
are unconstitutional." (R., 196). In the closely analogous case of Clarkv. Johnson, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held that absent tribes were not necessary or indispensable, reasoning as follows: 
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus against the Governor of New Mexico, 
not against any of the tribal officials. Resolution of this case requires only 
that we evaluate the Governor's authority under New Mexico law to enter 
into compacts and agreements absent legislative authorization of ratification. 
Such authority cannot derive from the compact and agreement; it must derive 
from state law. This is not an action based on breach of contract, and its 
resolution does not require us to adjudicate the rights and obligations of the 
respective parties to the compact. 
904 P .2d at 19. Although the issue was analyzed under somewhat different standard applicable to 
writs of mandamus, the same reasoning should be applied here by analogy. In the instant case, as 
the district court correctly recognized, Knox and Dotson do not seek to adjudicate the rights and 
obligations of the respective parties to the compact. Like Clark, resolution of the present controversy 
is dependent entirely upon interpretation and application of a state constitution. 
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The Governor asserts that Idaho will be exposed to a substantial risk ofincurring inconsistent 
obligations" if the tribes are not joined, because the Ninth Circuit authorized SBT to amend the 
compact to authorize slot machine gaming, and"[ t]hat judgment is binding on Idaho through claim-
preclusion principles because the potential illegality of tribal gaming video machines was not, but 
could have been, raised in earlier litigation." (Resp. Brf. at 41 ). What is astonishing about this 
argument is that is offered to support dismissal of the lawsuit, even though it is conceded that the 
respondents knew the gaming was likely not authorized but was in fact prohibited by the Idaho 
Constitution, yet they failed to raised the issue. This is precisely why the Court should reverse the 
motion to dismiss and allow the case to proceed on the merits. The Governor's argument also 
ignores the fact, established above, supra at 7-9, that entry of the requested declaratory judgment 
would impose no obligations on the state at all. The judgment would result in the tribal slot 
machines being automatically prohibited by the terms of compact and therefore by IGRA and the 
Johnson Act, which the federal, not state, government will be presumed to enforce. The Governor 
further ignores sever several well-established exceptions to application of res judicata under the facts 
of this case. 6 
6For example, some courts recognize "an exception to the doctrine of res judicata when "the public 
interest requires that re litigation not be foreclosed .. [ w ]hen the issue previously litigated involves an 
issue of public importance and there are unusual circumstances favoring reexamination of the issue." 
Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 845 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant case would almost certainly qualify for this 
exception. The Ninth Circuit recognizes the well-established exception to res judicata where "between 
the time of the first judgment and the second, there has been an intervening decision or a change in the 
law creating an altered situation." Clifton v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 997 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting State Farm v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162, 65 S. Ct. 573, 89 L. Ed. 812 (1945)). Here, an 
intervening judgment declaring the Idaho tribal gaming statutes unconstitutional would certainly "alter 
the situation" with regard to any decision by the Secretary whether Idaho law "permits such gaming" 
under IGRA. "Rule 60(b )(5) (also] creates an exception to the doctrine of claim preclusion ... [ which 
is J routinely used to challenge the continued validity of consent decrees, which courts often liken to 
contracts." Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1999). The 
''.judgment" of the Ninth Circuit upon which the Governor relies is also like a consent decree, in that it 
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The Governor next argues that Knox "cannot have it both ways," i.e., that she cannot 
consistently maintain that she is not "attacking" the Tribes' compacts (for purposes ofRule 19) while 
arguing that the compacts are void from their inception (for purposes of standing). If the two 
positions could not be consistently maintained, then the governor is hoist on his own petard. Neither 
would he be able to consistently maintain, as he does, both that the SBT compact is in no danger of 
being affected by declaratory judgment that its object is unconstitutional, and that such an outcome 
is sufficiently certain to establish the possibility of prejudice to the tribe's rights under a rule 19 
analysis. 
This simply demonstrates that despite Governor's efforts to combine the two analyses, the 
doctrine of standing and Rule 19 are entirely separate concepts involving different analyses, burdens 
of proof, and standards of review on appeal. As in Clark, supra, Knox and Dotson do not in fact 
directly attack the SBT compact. The fact that the slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino must be shut 
down in order to establish standing, does not change the fact that Knox and Dotson do not pray for 
such relief. They asks only for a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality of the Idaho Indian 
gaming statutes. 
Perhaps more importantly, a party cannot be deemed "necessary" under Rule 19(a)(l )(2) if 
the absent party's claimed interest is based upon a "palpably unconstitutional" statute. The Ninth 
Circuit recognized this principle in Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Shermoen involved 70 individual Native Americans and a commuruty ofYurok Indians who sought 
review of a judgment from a California federal district court dismissing the tribes' suit seeking 
was based entirely upon the implied or express agreement between the Governor and the tribes not to 
raise the inconvenient issue regarding the unconstitutionality of the statutory scheme purporting to 
authorize the compacted slot machines. 
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injunctive relief and a declaration that the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act violated their constitutional 
rights, on the grounds that the absent Hoopa and Y urok tribes were necessary and indispensable 
parties pursuant to Rule 19. Addressing Rule 19's "claimed interest" requirement, the Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
We do not hold, of course, that a district court would be required to find a 
party necessary based on patently frivolous claims made by that party. But 
such is clearly not the case before us; the absent tribes have an indisputable 
interest in the outcome of appellants' suit, and the Act, which has created that 
interest, is not so palpably unconstitutional that we could readily say the 
absent tribes' claims are fatuous. 
Id at 1318 . See also Andree v. Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. I 987). Because the 
statutes at issue in Shermoen and Andree were not obviously in violation of the Constitution, as the 
statutes at issue in the instant case, the Ninth Circuit found the tribe had a protectable interest and 
was therefore a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(2). The broad constitutional principles outlined 
in the Bill of Rights, which were implicated in Shermoen and Andree, simply made it too difficult 
to make a definitive determination whether the statutes at issue were facially unconstitutional. 
In contrast, the interest of the tribes in the present case is based upon statutes that are as 
"palpably unconstitutional" as a statute could possibly be. As previously established, I.C. §§ 67-
429B and-429C, upon which SBT's purported interest in the right to conduct slot machine gaming, 
is in direct conflict with Art. III, §20 of the Idaho Constitution, which unambiguously prohibits such 
slot machine gaming. The governor's attorney general has admitted such unconsitutionality. 
(Appendix to Appellants' opening Brief, p. 5). The Idaho Constitution's narrowly drafted, 
unambiguous prohibition of slot machine gaming makes it very easy to make this facial 
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determination. As such, the tribes cannot claim an interest sufficient to render them a "necessary 
party" within the meaning of Rule 19(a)(l)(2). 
C. The Tribes Are Not Indispensable Under Rule 19. 
There is no need to determine whether SBT is "indispensible" within the meaning ofIRCP 
l 9(a)(2) because it is "necessary" within the meaning of Rule l 9(a)(l ). However, even if the tribes 
were somehow necessary under Rule 19(a)(l), they clearly are not indispensable under Rule 
l 9(a)(2).7 If the tribes believe that their interest may be impaired then they have the ability to 
petition this court to intervene under Rule 24. This would require the tribal authorities to 
participate in and consent to the adjudication before this Court. Whether to participate is a decision 
for the tribal authorities, but their deliberate unwillingness to participate is insufficient to sustain 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 19. 
1. The Tribes' voluntary absence does not render them indispensable under Rule 19 nor 
does it relieve the Court ofits duty to interpret the Constitution. 
The cases cited by the Governor regarding Rule 19(a)(2) are fatally distinguishable. They 
do not involve palpably unconstitutional statutes upon which the tribes' claimed interests are based, 
they lack plaintiffs who advance truly public rights, and/or they involve prayers for relief directly 
requesting that the tribal compacts be nullified. 
On the other hand, several cases directly on point reject the Governor's assertion that the 
district court erred in failing to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 19, under 
7The factors the Court must consider in determining "whether in equity and good conscience the action 
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed" include: "first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; 
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder." 
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remarkably similar circumstances. For example, in County Chamber of Commerce, Inc v. Pataki, 
798 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 2003) is directly on point. In that case the plaintiffs, citizens and legislators 
opposed to casino gambling, alleged that a compact between the Governor and the St. Regis 
Mohawk Tribe allowing electronic class III gaming violated the New York constitutional ban on 
gambling. Initially, the trial court dismissed the case for plaintiffs' failure to join the tribe as an 
indispensable party. However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, holding that the tribes 
were not indispensable, and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. The trial court 
subsequently granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, declaring the gaming compact 
unconstitutional, and defendants appealed the decision, arguing the case should have been dismissed 
for failure to join the Indian tribe as a necessary and indispensable party. The Court disagreed: 
Jdatl057. 
The Tribe is not a party to this action. Although its interests are certainly 
affected by this litigation, the Tribe has chosen not to participate. Unless 
Congress provides otherwise, Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity 
against the judicial processes of states. [ citations omitted]. As a result, New 
York courts cannot force the Tribe to participate in this lawsuit. The State 
claims that the Tribe's absence requires us to dismiss this action. We 
disagree. 
The Saratoga Court went on to discuss the rules governing joinder of necessary and 
indispensable parties under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). CPLR I 00 I (b) is 
similar to Idaho Rule l 9(a)(2), setting forth nearly identical factors for the court to consider when 
deciding whether to dismiss an action where "jurisdiction over [the necessary party] can be obtained 
only by his consent or appearance." Id., 798 N.E.2d at 1058. 
Like the instant case, the defendants in Pataki "relie[ d] principally on paragraph (2), and 
argue[ d] that the prejudice to the Tribe caused by a judgment eviscerating the authority under which 
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it operates the casino should be sufficient to dismiss the action. In contrast, plaintiffs rely on 
paragraph (1 ), arguing that there can be no remedy for the alleged constitutional violation if the 
Tribe's absence requires dismissal." The Court concluded that "Plaintiffs' arguments are on firmer 
ground," reasoning as follows: 
Not only will these plaintiffs be stripped of a remedy ifwe hold that the 
Tribe is an indispensable party, but no member of the public will ever 
be able to bring this constitutional challenge. In effect, the Executive 
could sign agreements with any entity beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Court, free of constitutional interdiction. The Executive's actions would 
thus be insulated from review, a prospect antithetical to our system of 
checks and balances. 
There are two principal purposes of requiring dismissal owing to the 
absence of an indispensable party. First, mandatory joinder prevents multiple, 
inconsistent judgments relating to the same controversy. Second, joinder 
protects the otherwise absent parties who would be "embarrassed by 
judgments purporting to bind their rights or interests where they have had no 
opportunity to be heard". [ citations omitted]. 
Neither purpose applies here. The Tribe has chosen to be absent. Nobody 
has denied it the "opportnnity to be heard"; in fact, the Oneida Indian 
Nation, which operates the Turning Stone Casino, has appeared as amicus 
curiae making much the same arguments we would expect to be made by the 
Tribe had it chosen to participate. While sovereign immunity prevents the 
Tribe from being forced to participate in New York court proceedings, 
it does not require everyone else to forego the resolution of all disputes 
that could affect the Tribe (see Keene v Chambers, 271 N.Y. 326,330, 3 
N.E.2d 443 [1936]; Plaut v HGH Partnership, 59 A.D.2d 686, 398 N. Y.S.2d 
671 [1st Dept 1977]; 3 Weinstein-Kom-Miller, NY Civ Prac, 1001.10 
[citing cases]). While we fully respect the sovereign prerogatives of the 
Indian tribes, we will not permit the Tribe's voluntary absence to 
deprive these plaintiffs (and in turn any member of the public) of their 
day in court. 
We conclude that the alleged constitutional violation will be without remedy 
if this action is dismissed for the Tribe's nonjoinder. We further conclude 
that to the extent the Tribe is prejudiced by our adjudication of issues 
that affect its rights under the compact, the Tribe could have mitigated 
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that prejudice by participating in the suit ( cf United States ex rel. Steele 
v Turn Key Gaming, Inc., 135 F.3d 1249, 1252 [8th Cir 1998]). The Tribe's 
nonjoinder is therefore excused, and we proceed to discuss the merits. 
Pataki, 798 N.E.2d at 1058-59 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004), overruled in part on other 
grounds, Daily/and Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 2006), the majority 
leader of the Wisconsin Senate and the Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly filed an action against 
the Governor of Wisconsin and the Secretary of Administration, contending that they violated the 
Wisconsin constitution in agreeing to certain amendments to a gaming compact entered into with 
the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on grounds of 
standing and failure to join an indispensable party, namely the Indian tribe. The Wisconsin Supreme 
rejected both arguments for reasons similar to Pataki: 
The Tribe's decision not to participate as a party cannot deprive this court of 
its own core power to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and resolve 
disputes between coequal branches of state government. The Tribe has been 
aware of this litigation from its inception. This court would have welcomed 
its intervention. We will not venture the delicate balance of shared power 
among our three branches of government on the chosen absence of a potential 
party. 
The upshot of accepting the Governor's invitation to dispose of this case on 
procedural technicalities would be to insulate this agreement and any 
future agreement between a governor and a tribe from the powers of 
state judicial review. For over 200 years, it has been the province of the 
judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. See Wisconsin 
Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 436 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 2 L. Ed. 60, (1803)). We are responsible for resolving legal disputes 
among the three branches of our state government and, therefore, we proceed 
to the merits of the case. 
Id at 683 (emphasis added). 
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The only feature the Governor could identify supposedly distinguishing Saratoga and Pazer 
was that "[ n ]either case considered the feasability of an AP A-based suit against the Secretary with 
regard to compact approvals under IGRA, and both courts either explicitly or implicitly declined to 
follow the contrary application given under comparable circumstances to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, inter 
alia, American Greyhound." (Resp. Brf., p. 39 n.15). However, while asserting for purposes of Rule 
19 that such a remedy would be available to Knox and Dotson, for purposes of his argument on lack 
of standing the Governor argues that this same remedy is foreclosed by the applicable statute of 
limitations. (Resp. Brf. at 24). This discouraging double-speak only provides further support for 
the public's need to have this case addressed on the merits regarding the actions and proper role of 
the three branches of government in a constitutional democracy. 
The case of Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. McCall um, 655 N. W.2d 4 7 4, review denied, 
65 5 N. W.2d 129 (2002) appears indistinguishable. It involved a Wisconsin constitutional provision 
that contained an "absolute prohibition of any gaming activity" for the first 100 years of the state's 
existence. However, beginning in 1965, constitutional amendments were ratified permitting, in 
succession, sweepstakes and other promotional contests, charitable bingo and raffles, and in 1987, 
pari-mutuel on-track betting on racing and a state lottery. As a result of these amendments and the 
enactment ofIGRA, by 1992 Wisconsin's 11 Indian tribes entered into 7-year tribal-state gaming 
compacts purporting to authorize Blackjack, electronic gambling machines, and pull-tabs with 
automatic renewal terms. Then in 1993, as in Idaho, the Wisconsin constitution was again amended 
to unambiguously prohibit all forms of casino gambling, except bingo, raffles, pari-mutual on-track 
betting and the current state-run lottery. Id. at 476. 
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The plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction prohibiting the governor from executing any 
renewed, modified, or extended compacts authorizing gambling prohibited by the 1993 constitutional 
amendment. The governor responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to join the 11 tribes under 
Rule 19, which motion was granted by the trial court. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed. 
Applying the same four factors for indispensability as contained in Rule 19(a)(2), IRCP, the court 
found that the first two factors weighed strongly in favor of dismissal, and the third should be given 
little weight. The court found the fourth factor dispositive, i.e., whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the case is dismissed for non-joinder of the tribes, the court 
The Governor does not dispute that dismissal of this action will leave 
Dairyland "without a judicial remedy to challenge the provisions of gaming 
compacts," but contends that this factoris vastly outweighed by the prejudice 
to the tribes in proceeding without them, as the circuit court concluded. 
Dairyland, of course, argues just the opposite, and adds that the interests of 
the public in having the issues it raises resolved tips the scales in favor of 
permitting the action to continue. We agree with Dairyland. 
The parties cite and discuss a number of cases from other jurisdictions 
having differing outcomes on the question of whether Indian tribes are 
indispensable parties to various actions in which it is claimed they have an 
interest. 13 We find persuasive the reasoning of two state courts which each 
concluded Indian tribes were not indispensable parties in light of facts and 
circumstances closely analogous to those now before us. 
Dairyland, 655 N.W.2d at 485-86. 
One of the cases the court found persuasive was Saratoga, supra. The Wisconsin court also 
found Lungren v. Community Redev. Agency, 56 Cal.App.4th 868, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 786 (Cal. App. 
1997) to be very persuasive. In Lungren, like Saratoga and Panzer, the court gave considerable 
weight to the interest of the public in having decided the question of whether a public agency had 
exceeded its lawful authority in transferring public land to an Indian tribe for construction of a 
casino. Id. at 794-95 ("If it is established that the law of California does not permit a court to hear 
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a challenge to the actions of the Agency in the present case because of an inability to join the Tribe 
in the suit, the effect will be to immunize any local entity from court review of transfers of publicly 
owned real property to India tribes."). The Wisconsin court also noted that Lungren also gave 
significant weight to the fourth factor, i.e., the lack of another available remedy if the action were 
not allowed to proceed. Dairyland, 655 N.W.2d at 486 (citing Lungren, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 796). 
Based upon these cases and the authorities cited therein, the· court in Dairyland held that 
application of the fourth factor under Rule 19( a)(2) required reversal of the district court's order of 
dismissal, reasoning as follows: 
The present litigation does not simply seek to resolve a dispute among private 
actors. Dairyland's lawsuit asserts that the Wisconsin Constitution, as 
amended in 1993, precludes the Governor from extending or renewing Indian 
gaming compacts which allow casino gambling in Wisconsin. There can be 
little question that the citizens of Wisconsin have a considerable interest in 
ensuring that state officials act in accordance with the peoples' will as 
. expressed in the state constitution. If this action is dismissed because the 
tribes cannot be joined as parties, not only will Dairyland have no adequate 
remedy, but an important legal issue having significant public policy 
implications will evade resolution. We conclude that, in equity and good 
conscience, this action, like those we have cited in California and New York, 
must be allowed to proceed in the absence of the tribes, notwithstanding the 
potential prejudice to their interests. 
Dairyland, 655 N.W.2d at 486-87. 
The logic of these cases, Saratoga, Panzer, Dairyland and Lungren, is unassailable and 
applies with great force in the present case. Sovereign immunity prevents involuntary joinder of the 
tribes. However, it does not require the citizens ofldaho to forego the resolution of all disputes that 
could possibly affect the tribes, especially, as in this case, where there is a clear and blatant violation 
of the Idaho Constitution. Nor does it require or permit this Court to abdicate its constitutional duty 
to resolve cases and controversies over the constitutionality of an act of the Idaho legislature. The 
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tribes' voluntary absence should not be allowed to deprive Knox and Dotson of their day in court. 
Dismissal of this case on such procedural technicalities would be the equivalent of ruling that any 
and all acts of the Idaho legislature and governor pertaining to Indian gaming, and conceivably 
gambling in general, are forever insulated from judicial review, regardless of their facial and 
knowing contravention of the Idaho Constitution, thereby barring the courthouse doors to citizens 
of Idaho suffering concrete injury as a result of such unconstitutional acts. As in the above cases, 
this case involves fundamental issues of profound consequence to our constitutional system of 
checks and balances, which cry out for adjudication. In equity and good conscience this matter 
should proceed on the merits in the tribes voluntary absence. 
2. The Tribes are not "indispensable" under Rule 19 by application of the "public 
rights" doctrine. 
Even under the distinguishable federal cases cited in the Defendants' briefing, the tribes in 
the instant case are not indispensable under the "public rights doctrine," concerning "litigation .... 
[which] transcends the private interests of the litigants and seeks to vindicate a public right." Wilbur 
v. Locke, 423 F .3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006). Under this exception the absent party's interests may 
be impaired but will not be allowed to destroy those interests in the party's absence. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit first applied this doctrine in Conner v. Burford, 848 F .2d 1441 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012, 109 S. Ct. 1121, 103 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1989). In Conner, an 
environmental group challenged the issuance of oil and gas leases by the BLM on the ground that 
an adequate EIS had not been prepared. On appeal, several lessees claimed that they were necessary 
parties under Rule 19, but the Ninth Circuit held the public rights exception applicable: 
Subsequent courts have also refused to require the joinder of all parties 
affected by public rights litigation -- even when those affected parties have 
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Id. at 1459-60. 
property interests at stake -- because of the tight constraints traditionaljoinder 
rules would place on litigation against the government. [ many citations 
omitted] . . . Like the cases cited above, this case is amenable to the 
application of the National Licorice public rights doctrine. The appellees' 
litigation against the government does not purport to adjudicate the rights of 
current lessees; it merely seeks to enforce the public right to administrative 
compliance with the environmental protection standards of NEPA and the 
ESA. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson do not purport to adjudicate any rights of the parties 
under the SBT compact. They seek to enforce the public right to ensure that the legislature and 
governor comply with, and not engage in acts which they knew are in violation of, the Idaho 
Constitution. Unlike the cases cited in the Governor's brief, the present controversy does not involve 
a close constitutional question. The challenged statutes are in patent violation of the Idaho 
Constitution, a fact of which the Governor was well aware yet proceeded to take action furthering 
the constitutional violation. 
The fact that Knox and Dotson have suffered particularized injury does not somehow convert 
this issue from a public to a private one. Otherwise, since the doctrine of standing requires that every 
plaintiff suffer particularized harm, the "public interest" exception could never be satisfied and 
would be rendered meaningless. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that"[ t ]he general subject 
of gaming [is] of great public interest." Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1026 
(9th Cir. 2002). But unlike Am. Greyhound, Knox and Dotson are not competitors of the tribes 
seeking to share in the spoils of casino gambling. They seek to vindicate the public's right to 
enforcement of the Idaho Constitution. If there is a public right in administrative enforcement of the 
procedural rules under NEPA and ESA as declared in Conner, then surely there is an even greater 
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public right of the citizens of Idaho in enforcement of the substantive provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution under the rather egregious circumstances of this case. 
Contrary to the Defendants' assertions, unlike Wilbur, the tribes' interests here would not be 
"destroyed" by proceeding in their voluntary absence. SBT would still retain their full rights under 
the compact to engage in all gaming permitted by Idaho law, including bingo and raffle games which 
the tribes continue to conduct. The requested declaratory judgment could also be crafted to avoid 
any further destruction ofrights. In Nat'! Licorice v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940). In that case the 
Supreme Court 
restricted the applicability of the public rights exception to cases in which the 
third parties' interests at issue are not destroyed. That is, "the third parties 
[ must be] left free to assert such legal rights as they might have acquired .. 
. . " Id at 366. While the National Licorice Court upheld the NLRB's 
termination of an unlawful "yellow dog" contract, it ordered the Board to 
revise its order by omitting language that the contracts were "void and of no 
effect." The Court also required the Board to state that the order was "without 
prejudice to the assertion by the employees [the non-parties to the action] of 
any legal rights they may have acquired .... " 
Conner, 848 F.3d at 1859-60 ( quoting Nat 'l Licorice, 309 U.S. at 367). 
Likewise, Knox and Dotson do not request rescission or termination of the State's compacts 
with the tribes. They seek a declaration that LC.§§ 67-429B and-429C are in direct violation of the 
Idaho Constitution. The Court can similarly craft its declaration of unconstitutionality to make it 
without prejudice to the assertion of the tribes of any legal rights they may have acquired by 
compact with the State ofidaho. Consequently, the "public rights" exception applies here to prevent 
the tribes from being deemed indispensable under Rule 19. The Defendants' motion to dismiss must 
therefore be denied on this additional ground. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Knox and Dotson have met the "rather undemanding" standard 
of proving the redressablity component of standing, and the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding the tribes were not necessary or indispensable parties. Accordingly, the district court's 
order of dismissal should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded the district court to 
proceed on the merits of the amended complaint. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2009. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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